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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLITICS OF THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION’S IRAN POLICY
By Nedim Hogic*
Abstract: Donald Trump’s promise to lead an “America first” foreign policy captured the
attention of both American and international legal scholars. This paper aims to join that debate
by examining the international legal challenges of Trump administration’s policy towards Iran.
It does so by examining two main approaches of the administration: the exercise of unilateral
sanctions towards Iran and the negotiation strategy deployed by Donald Trump personally. In
examining the former, the paper relies on doctrinal legal research. In examining the latter
behavioral approach to international law and economics, I use a relatively novel approach
borrowing insights from political psychology and behavioral economics to explain many of the highrisk choices that the Administration took over the course of events. I find that after the cancellation
of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the “Iran nuclear deal”), unilateralism—as one of
the main characteristics of this policy—failed to coerce Iran into negotiating a new deal. Instead,
the unilateral exercise of sanctions reduced the “weaponized interdependence” of the sanctions’
regime into a negotiation leverage. Despite being almost unchallengeable before a legal forum, the
lack of wider support for the sanctions led to considerations of their evasion from the European
Union and other international actors. The negotiation style coupled Trump’s calls for a new deal
with bold threats of military might and failed to lead to reconsideration of Iran’s approach to
regional security. By staying within the Iran nuclear deal, Iran managed to strengthen its
immediate negotiation position. Ultimately, after two and a half years of such policy, both the
United States and international actors have launched a number of multilateral initiatives that
are to remedy the damage done by high-risk negotiation tactic deployed by the administration and
the then President Trump personally.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2016 election campaign of Donald Trump promised
significant changes to the United States’ (U.S.) foreign policy, changes
that would purportedly rectify the (perceived) exploitation of U.S.
power by other countries. While all post-World War II U.S. presidents
have taken far-reaching actions that have shaped the theory and
practice of international law, few, if any, have been so negative in their
assessment of the effects of the international legal order on U.S.
interests. Has this negativity led to a relocation of the United States
within the international legal order and, if so, what were the
consequences of these actions? This issue is currently debated by
prominent international legal scholars and policy practitioners.1

* PhD Researcher School of Advanced Studies Sant’ Anna, Pisa, Visiting Researcher
Harvard Law School 2020, LL.M. Harvard Law School ‘13. An earlier draft of this
paper has been presented at the EUI-SSSUP workshop for doctoral researchers in
Florence in 2019. I thank professors Anne van Aaken, Juergen Kurtz, Caterina
Sganga and Mladen Mrdalj for their useful insights.
1
HAROLD HOGJU KOH, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW ( 2018); Eric A. Posner, Liberal Internationalism and the Populist Backlash, 49 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 795 (2016); Jack L. Goldsmith & Shannon Mercer, International Law and
Institutions in the Trump Era, 61 GER.Y.B INT’L.L. 11 (2019); Joseph S. Nye, The Rise
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One interesting strain of this debate is taken by two former
legal advisors of U.S. presidents, Professor Harold Koh of Yale Law
School and Professor Jack Goldsmith of Harvard Law School. Their
differing takes on Trump’s presidency stem from diverging views of
U.S. domestic law, particularly presidential powers in foreign affairs
and fundamentally different understandings of international law. For
Koh, as well as other transnational legal process advocates, the
unilateralist agenda of the U.S. president is dangerous to the
international legal order because it seems to reject important
international legal commitments of the United States, focusing instead
solely on the administration’s understanding of national interests.2
Consequently, all the renegotiations or unilateral withdrawals from the
international legal commitments that Donald Trump had carried out
should and will result in the opposition of other actors of the
transnational legal process: states, international organizations, private
actors and nongovernmental organizations. Such opposition, in turn,
will challenge interest, identity, interactions, and internalization as the
pillars of the transnational legal process, which could bring about
instability, insecurity, and other undesired consequences on the
international plane.3
Goldsmith, who bases his views of international law primarily
on the realist approach, views the states primarily as unitary, rational
actors that try to maximize their gains and protect their interests,
cooperating with other states if it is in their interest.4 Skeptical toward
and Fall of American Hegemony from Wilson to Trump, 95 INT’L AFF. 63 (2019); Jonathan
Havercroft et al., Donald Trump as Global Constitutional Breaching Experiment, 7 GLOBAL
CONST. 1 (2018); Clare F. Moran, Crystallising the International Rule of Law: Trump’s
Accidental Contribution to International Law, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 491 (2017); Rachel
Brewster, The Trump Administration and the Future of the WTO, 44 YALE J. INT’L L.
ONLINE. 6 (2018). But see Bosco, “We’ve Been Here Before: The Durability of
Multilateralism”, 70 J. INT’L AFF. 9 (2017); Andrea Birdsall & Rebecca Sanders,
Trumping International Law?, 21 INT’L STUD. PERSPECT. 275 (2020).
2 See Harold Hogju Koh, The Trump Administration and International Law, 56
WASHBURN L. J. 413 (2017).
3
Harold Hogju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal Process,
75 NEB. L. REV. 207 (1996).
4
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005). While the publications of Posner and Goldsmith have been very
influential in shaping the law and economics approach to international law, they
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the “unfounded doctrinal descriptions and prescriptions of traditional
legal scholarship,”5 this view of international law resembles that of a
patchwork of pledges the states follow if it is in their interest to do so.6
Thus, Trump’s rhetoric may hurt international law, but as long as other
states find it does not challenge their interests, they will follow it and
cooperate. If we take into account some other explanations of those in
favor of such an approach, we find that they view Trump’s actions not
as a driver of the crisis; rather, they are a response to the inevitable
backlash against the globalization of the 1990s,7 which produced
winners and losers in both the center and the periphery of the
globalization process.8 Pressures arising out of this question of political
economy and the global redistribution of global public goods may
indeed require a new, unilateral approach. Both approaches are closely
related to theories of international relations. The transnational legal
process has been inspired by constructivism and (to a lesser extent)
liberal internationalism while the realist approach to international law
has been strongly inspired by a synonymous approach to international
relations and to some extent by law and economics.9 As such, the two
approaches differ not only in their understanding of what international

should not be viewed as representing an affirmative perception of the Trump
administration’s policy toward Iran or as exemplary of the vast body of thought that
law and economics-oriented scholars have developed in the field of international law.
Goldsmith and Posner initially dubbed their approach “New International Law
Scholarship,” but this name did not stick to this normative view of international law
they offered. See Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New International Law
Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 463 (2005). Therefore, I use the term “realist”
to denote their particular view of international law. For the application of this term
in such a way. See Oliver Jütersonke, Realist Approaches to International Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 337–342 (Anne
Orford, Florian Hoffmann & Martin Clark eds., 2016).
5
Andrea Bianchi, INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORIES: AN INQUIRY INTO
DIFFERENT WAYS OF THINKING 267 (2016).
6
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4.
7
Posner, supra note 1, at 11.
8
BRANKO MILANOVIC, GLOBAL INEQUALITY: A NEW APPROACH FOR
THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (2016).
9
Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Constructivism and International Law, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 119, 131–32 (Jeffrey L.
Dunoff & Mark Pollack eds., 2013).
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law is and what it ought to be but also in how they address the
relationship between the law and politics.
For the transnational legal process, the boundary between
international law and politics is fluid,10 which is why the approach was
criticized as an extension of the influence of international relations
over international law, especially the American liberal strain of this
theory that was dominant in the 1990s concerning law.11 Professors
Eric Posner and Goldsmith do not take a firm view on the distinction
between law and politics, either; they view international law as politics
by other means,12 while the distinction between law and politics
becomes clearer in their view of domestic politics, in particular the
power that the U.S. president has in foreign affairs.13 In Goldsmith’s
view, the presidential power to enter or terminate international
agreements is “suboptimal” because it often lacks transparency but is
wide, giving the president enough power to operate through “political
commitments” without authorization from Congress.14 This power
may be constrained, not necessarily through acts of other branches of
government but through acts of those who mobilize public opinion.15
Koh, to the contrary, believes that the executive does not have
such unilateral power because other branches of government may
Dominika Svarc, Using Force in International Affairs: The Role of International
Law in Contemporary International Politics, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A MULTIPOLAR
WORLD 68 (Matthew Happold ed., 2012).
11
Or, as Roth-Isigkeit put it, the “law is about what works.” See David RothIsigkeit, The Blinkered Discipline?: Martti Koskenniemi and Interdisciplinary Approaches to
International Law, 9 INT’L THEORY 410 (2017).
12 Cf. Anne van Aaken, To Do Away with International Law? Some Limits to ‘The
Limits of International Law,’ 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 289 (2006) (offering a view of their book
as reductionist towards international law).
13
Eric Posner & Daniel Abebe, Foreign Affairs Legalism: A Critique, (U. Chi.
Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 291, 2010),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1551300.
14
Curtis A Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over International
Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201 (2018).
15 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012) (explaining how the public opinion influenced the
constraining of strong presidencies). Cf. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE,
THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2011) (arguing
for accepting of strong presidency as an inevitable product of contemporary politics).
10
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constrain its exercise.16 Consequently, the two approaches favor
different types of foreign policy engagements; the transnational legal
process favors the multilateral and, while the realists do not necessarily
favor the unilateral, they see very little added value in multilateralism.
These differences explain why Goldsmith and other advocates of
realism, like Posner, view Trump’s impact on international law as a
unilateral response to the global populist wave.17 Contrary to this,
transnational legal process advocates see his actions as an attempt to
ride this wave and disrupt the global legal order.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to settle this debate or act
as an arbiter between these different views. Instead, it aims to join the
debate, understanding it as a part of a wider inquiry on the effects of
Trump’s presidency, one that encompasses questions of the stability
and usefulness of the international legal order and the role that populist
governments as actors aim to play in it.18 It does so by analyzing the
actions taken by the Trump administration toward Iran with regard to
the cancellation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
a multilateral framework agreement governing Iran’s disengagement
from the nuclear armament program.
This withdrawal has created different international legal
problems: it brought the United States before the International Court
of Justice,19 initiated a withdrawal of multinational companies from
Iran,20 led to a reconsideration of the status of the dollar as a global
reserve currency,21 and further complicated the existing stand-off
between the European Union (EU) and the United States in the World
Trade Organization.22 Both countries engaged in cyberwarfare
operations against one another23 and used military force, most notably
in the targeted killing of Iranian general Soleimani and the response of
See Harold Hogju Koh, Presidential Power to Terminate International Agreements,
128 YALE L.J.F. 432 (2018).
17 See Posner, supra note 1, at 16.
18
Heike Krieger, Populist Governments and International Law, 30 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 971 (2019).
19 See infra, Part II B.
20 See infra, Part II C.
21 See infra, part II D.
22 See infra, part II D.
23 See infra, part III B.
16
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the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps to this attack, which brought
Iran and the United States to the verge of a full-out war.24 Recognizing
that an analysis of the administration’s action covers the fields of both
international law and international relations and recollecting the
overlapping agenda of both fields,25 I draw upon insights from both
disciplines in the approach to this research.26 In so doing, I identify the
salient points of departure that give identity to the international law
and policy views of this administration.
The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I provide
a background summary concerning the JCPOA’s political and legal
negotiation history, the sanctions toward Iran, and United States
withdrawal from JCPOA. Acknowledging that the United States has
traditionally used sanctions as a statecraft tool,27 I argue that the
“weaponized interdependence”28 of the global governance
mechanisms in global finance—coupled with a strong enforcement
practice from the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC)29—led to
extremely high compliance with the sanctions regime.30 Furthermore,
See infra, part III B.
See Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations
Theory: A New Generation of Inter-Disciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367 (1998);
Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38
HARVARD INT’L L. J. 437 (1997).
26
Certainly, these are not the only two approaches that a legal or political
analysis of the U.S.-Iran developments in the past few years may take. For example,
an approach that would focus more on foreign policy issues or the national security
interests is undoubtedly equally possible and relevant. But the scope of this paper
does not allow us to engage these perspectives.
27
SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Steve
Chan & A. Cooper Drury eds., 2000); DANIEL DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS
PARADOX: ECONOMIC STATECRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1999).
28
Henry Farrell & Abraham L. Newman, Weaponized Interdependence: How
Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion, 44 INT’L SECURITY 42 (2019).
29
David Restrepo Amariles & Matteo Winkler, U.S. Economic Sanctions and
the Corporate Compliance of Foreign Banks, 51 INT’L LAWYER 497 (2018). See also
REFINITIV, Fines for Banks that Breached U.S. OFAC Sanctions,
https://www.refinitiv.com/content/dam/marketing/en_us/documents/infograph
ics/fines-for-banks-that-breached-us-sanctions-infographic.pdf (last accessed Mar.
12, 2022) (providing a detailed overview of the fines issued by the OFAC).
30
Sascha Lohmann, The Convergence of Transatlantic Sanction Policy Against Iran,
29 CAMB. REV. INT’L AFF. 930 (2016).
24
25
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the sanctions imposed on Iran in 2010, given their U.N. backing and
EU support as well as the negotiation process and the legal mechanism
of the JCPOA, were a display of a multilateral engagement and
transnational legal process. Thus, the withdrawal from the JCPOA and
reinstatement of sanctions created immediate global legal
consequences that we discuss and explain. These consequences are not
limited to the virtual cut-off of the Iranian regime from the global trade
and the financial markets but have a global reach, owing to the
extraterritorial application of the U.S. sanctions. I explain why these
sanctions were widely held illegal yet were—and remain—virtually
unchallengeable.
The second part of the article draws heavily from a relatively
novel approach to international law called behavioral international law
and economics (BIntLE).31 I use this approach because it is
exceptionally suited to discussing those issues that fall between
domestic law, international law, and international relations as it fills the
gap between these disciplines. Since the actions of Trump’s
administration towards Iran require a legal analysis that naturally
overlaps with the negotiations between the two countries as well as
different political considerations, this approach is both appropriate and
necessary. Therefore, I first introduce this approach to international
law, explaining that it proposes that the actions of international actors

31 See Anne van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and Economics, 55
HARVARD INT’L L. J. 421 (2014); Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 163 U.
PA.L. REV. 1099 (2015); Anne van Aaken, & Tomer Broude, The Psychology of
International Law: An Introduction, 30 EUR. J. INT’L LAW. 1225 (2019). I will primarily
rely on these texts in explaining the BIntLE approach to international law. A warning
should be given at this stage: while the name “behavioural law and economics” has
both an economic and a psychological component to it, it should be understood that
many insights of BIntLE rely heavily on psychology, in particular political
psychology. However, I use the term BIntLE and not a term that would emphasize
the psychological insights per se, as BIntLE has become the term used to describe
this analysis. As van Aaken explained, “The psychological insights we use are
commonly named behavioral economics, given that this research tests and challenges
the rational choice hypothesis to a hitherto unknown extent.” (emphasis in original)
Anne van Aaken, Guest Post: Behavioral International Law and Economics: Benchmark and
Applications,
OPINIO
JURIS
(Oct.
30,
2013),
https://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/30/guest-post-behavioral-international-lawbenchmark-applications/.
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may be explained through their bounded rationality by studying the
information and cognitive framework within which they operate.
Using the concepts introduced by the behavioural approach to
international law and economics, such as the framing effect, status quo
bias, hawkish bias, and the endowment effect, I explain how the
Trump administration attempted to use its so-called “maximum
pressure” campaign to re-negotiate a deal with Iran that would be more
favorable to what it perceived as its long-term strategic goals.
I find that a view of international law strongly influenced by
the realist approach different inasmuch as it favors U.S.
exceptionalism, which had a framing effect influencing Trump’s
decision to abandon the JCPOA and re-impose sanctions unilaterally.
As a result, the JCPOA was understood not as an international legal
commitment or even a functional tool for détente in the Middle East—
it was simply reduced to a bad policy choice, a “bad deal.” This framing
effect, I argue, played a crucial role in its cancellation because the high
risks taken were to be justified by an aversion to loss that the status
quo—in the administration’s view—represented.
Consequently, the JCPOA was replaced by a high-risk
negotiation tactic deployed by the administration and Donald Trump
personally. The ultimate goals of this strategy were to use coercive
measures such as sanctions and other elements of the maximum
pressure campaign to coerce Iran into renegotiating its position as a
regional power in the Middle East. The insights of negotiation scholars
combined with the unprecedented transparency of Trump’s decisionmaking processes and his (nominally) co-authored book on the
subject32 allowed analysis of the bounded rationality of these actions
and identification of a hawkish bias and other traits of Trump’s
negotiation style. Thus, I view some of the main aspects of the
diplomatic-military stand-off, such as cyberwarfare operations and the
use of force between the two countries, as elements of a negotiation
process that ultimately failed in the realization of the goals through
unilateral actions.

Eugene B. Kogan, Art of the Power Deal: The Four Negotiation Roles of Donald
J. Trump, 35(1) NEGOT. J. 65 (2019); DONALD J. TRUMP, & TONY SCHWARTZ,
TRUMP: THE ART OF THE DEAL (1987).
32
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I argue that the combination of an exceptionalist view of
international law and a high-risk negotiation tactic characterized by loss
aversion is what defined the Trump administration’s approach to
international law and policy toward Iran. I conclude by synthesizing
the findings of the sanctions and diplomatic–military engagement
between the United States and Iran, fitting them back into the debate
between the different views on U.S. international law and the U.S.
presidential powers. I find that, ultimately, none of the proclaimed
goals of the cancellation of sanctions or the negotiation process were
achieved through unilateral actions. Instead, the United States was
faced with a realistic possibility of further military strengthening of Iran
contributing to a strengthening of Iran’s negotiating position. Because
of this, the United States opted for a return to multilateral initiatives
by attempting to use different mediators and agents to compel Iran to
negotiate and called upon the states that have remained within the
JCPOA to prevent a further rearmament of Iran.33
II. U.S. SANCTIONS TOWARD IRAN AND THE JCPOA
A. The sanctions and their mechanism
Traditionally, states use unilateral sanctions as a tool of their
foreign policy and statecraft.34 The approach finds its modern
expression in the U.S. sanctions against Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and,
to a lesser extent, Russia. These sanctions are often unilateral—one
recent overview of the U.S. sanctions program found only eleven out
of thirty-five programs to be related to a U.N. sanctions regime.35 But
these sanctions rarely, if ever, target only the country subjected to a
sanctions regime. Ever since World War One, trading with the enemy
represents a legitimate concern to which U.S. legislators or the
president respond.36 The sanctions on some of these countries do not
just prevent U.S. citizens and companies from doing business with
33
34

see KERN
(2009).

See infra, part III.
For an evolution of sanctions from World War One to the present day,
ALEXANDER, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 8–29

Devika Hovell, Unfinished Business of International Law: The Questionable
Legality of Autonomous Sanctions, 113 AM. J. INT’L UNBOUND 140 (2019).
36
See DREZNER, supra note 27.
35
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entities located in the targeted countries. Starting from the sanctions
imposed on Cuba after the adoption of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act (also known as the Helms–Burton Act37) in
1996, the sanctions also have a so-called secondary effect—that is,
extraterritorial application to other countries and individuals who are
considered to be in breach of the sanctions if they use currency,
products, parts of products, or financial institutions that are American
to make payments or provide goods and services to sanctioned
countries. This secondary effect is the first primary source of power of
unilateral U.S. sanctions. Furthermore, the sanctions prevent access to
global financial markets, prevent trade from being executed in U.S.
dollars (as the most reliable global reserve currency), and penalize not
only the sanctioned state and companies based therein, but also all
others who fail to comply with these prohibitions.38 Despite the
behavior in question being conducted abroad, the jurisdictional nexus
for the Office of Foreign Asset Control to act relies on the fact that
the transactions—although executed abroad—have been made in U.S.
dollars. Every such transaction entails the usage of a U.S.-based
correspondent bank and such a usage constitutes what has been
dubbed “correspondent bank jurisdiction.”39 The legislative measures
that strengthen these sanctions evolved greatly during Obama’s
presidency. The 2007 amendment to the International Economic
Powers Enforcement Act made it unlawful for any person to engage
in conduct, including conduct abroad, that causes others to violate U.S.
sanctions.40 Thus, access to the global financial markets and the
limitation of banking transactions represent the second major source
of the power of the sanctions. The development of these sanctions
during the 2000s was heavily influenced not just by attempts to curtail
Iran and North Korea but also to prevent terrorist financing.

37
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–
6091 (1996).
38
Susan Emmenegger, Extraterritorial Economic Sanctions and their Foundation
in International Law, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 631 (2016).
39 Id. at 659.
40 Id. at 654.
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Both the effect and the legality of these sanctions are disputed.
Sanctions inflict great pain on societies and their economic power,41
but they often fail to coerce the states toward a desired behavior, as
the cases of Serbia, Iraq, Cuba, and, more recently, Russia, Sudan, and
Venezuela testify.42 When enjoying multilateral support, as was the case
with the EU’s accession to the U.S. sanctions regime on Iran in 2010,
the probability of a change in the behavior of a regime or the
overthrow of the regime increases.43 But, when used against regimes
that have strong claims of legitimacy or that are able to project the
illegitimacy of the sanctions as an outside attack on the population,
their effectiveness declines.44 Unilateral sanctions, in contrast, seldom
lead to a change of the behavior of states or a change in the compliance
of the regimes. Therefore, the creation of the JCPOA, an agreement
between Iran and the P5+1 countries45 , which ended the sanctions’
regime against Iran in exchange for the establishment of limitations on
the Iranian nuclear program and the establishment of an oversight and
verification mechanism by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), could be understood as a success of the sanctions’ regime.
The sanctions’ regime, however, was not an end unto itself; the
restrictions were intended to change the behavior and, potentially,
upset the stability of the Iranian regime. In this sense, it is much harder
to assess their effectiveness. While they did not upset the stability of
the Iranian political system, they created a different internal dynamic
contributing to internal divisions within the Iranian political class over

41 See Idriss Jazairy (U.N. Secretary General), Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on Enjoyment of Human Rights: Note, U.N.
Doc. A/73/175 (July 17, 2018).
42 See Dursun Peksen. When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A
Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature. Defence and Peace
Economics, (2019), 1–13 (offering an overview of the effectiveness of sanctions in
the literature)
43
Lohmann, supra note 30, at 933.
44
Julia Grauvogel & Christian von Soest, Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why
Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes, 53 EUR. J. POLIT. RES.
635 (2014). But see DREZNER, supra note 27, at 124 (claiming that such an argument
lacks an empirical foundation).
45
The P5+1 refers to UN Security Council’s five permanent members plus
Germany.
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whether to comply with the demands of the international community
led by the United States.46
B. The negotiations and commitments of the JCPOA
The JCPOA was not solely a successful result of the sanctions.
It was also a success for the negotiators from both Iran and the P5+1
countries who were not only in the business of protecting the interests
of their respective nations but also, in the case of Iran and the United
States, of overcoming the domestic and regional opposition to the deal.
The JCPOA was preceded by a full decade of negotiations that
involved not only the two countries but European leaders and the
IAEA.47 The negotiations were a result of the fear and opposition led
primarily by the United States, but also by the three major European
countries (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom), toward the
development of the Iranian nuclear program.48 The two central actors
of the negotiations, Iran and the United States, held historical
grievances against each other—Iran, perceiving itself as a victim of the
1953 foreign-backed coup and Iraqi aggression of the 1980s, which
was supported by the Western countries, and the United States, a
country that not only had been traumatized by the 1979 hostage crisis
but has also eluded any bilateral engagement with Iran ever since.49
Originally launched in the 1950s under the U.S.-led “Atoms
for Peace” initiative, the Iranian nuclear program entered the
international spotlight in 2003 when the unwillingness of the Iran
leadership to allow the inspections requested by the International
Atomic Energy Agency forced a declaration that the country was in
breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and that Iran
See Pejman Abdolmohammadi & Giampiero Cama, Iran as a Peculiar Hybrid
Regime: Structure and Dynamics of the Islamic Republic, 42 BRITISH J. OF MIDDLE E.
STUDIES 558, 573-74 (2015).
47 See generally, DANIEL H. JOYNER, IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM CONFRONTATION TO ACCORD (2016) (explaining the
evolution of the negotiations over attempts to bring the Iranian nuclear program in
line with international law).
48 Id.
49 See FRANZ CEDE, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: WHY INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATIONS FAIL 66–68 (2012) (providing insight into how these perceptions
have shaped the positions of the Iranian negotiators).
46
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may well have been on a course of developing nuclear weapons.50 The
negotiations were triggered when the Iranian authorities, in violation
of the provisions of the NPT—to which it was a party—failed to notify
the IAEA of its nuclear program and allow its inspectors to conduct a
review of the Iranian facilities, in the period between 2003 and 2008.
This behavior increased a suspicion that the declared civilian purpose
of the Iranian nuclear program differed from the actual purpose—
development of nuclear warheads. This was a legitimate concern, as
Iran historically had sent mixed signals over its intention to use nuclear
weapons as a means of nuclear deterrence,51 despite its main religious
leader issuing a fatwa against their use.52 The lack of progress in the
2003–2010 negotiations of the remedies to this issue served as a pretext
for the United States to enact the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability and Divestment Act in 2010, after which any access of
a foreign bank to Iran involved the risk of a heavy fine as well as the
loss of access to the U.S. financial market, thereby effectively imposing
a financial embargo.53 At that point, the EU enacted its own, similar
sanctions regime,54 which led to a convergence of two major
geopolitical actors against Iran.55 From 2003 to 2013, the U.N. Security
Council not only condemned the Iranian noncompliance with the
treaty but imposed sanctions and made illegal the development of the
ballistic missile program56—development that was important not only
with relation to the nuclear capabilities but overall military deterrence
capability of Iran. The financial isolation that resulted did not extract
significant concessions from the Iranian regime until a change of
50
FARHAD REZAEI, IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 1979–2015: A STUDY IN
PROLIFERATION AND ROLLBACK 92–95 (2015).
51
JOYNER, supra note 47, at 13.
52 Id. at 14.
53
RICHARD NEPHEW, THE ART OF SANCTIONS: A VIEW FROM THE FIELD
77 (2017).
54
While similar in scope, the sanctions of the EU against Iran were not
extraterritorial in their application. See Joanne Scott, Extraterritoriality and Territorial
Extension in EU Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 87 (2014).
55
CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (2d ed.
2015) (noting that “[t]he apparent acceptance, at least by the EU, of the
extraterritorial dimension of the U.S. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability,
and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), for instance, may be explained by a shared
perception of the danger emanating from Iran”).
56
U.N. S.C. Res. 1929 (Jun. 9, 2010).
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government occurred in Iran in 2013. Hawkish President
Ahmadinejad, a candidate of the conservatives who advocated for the
acquisition of nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence57, was
replaced by moderate President Rouhani. This signaled a different
attitude in the population, which was suffering tremendously under the
weight of the sanctions, as evidenced by a 25% contraction of the
Iranian citizen purchasing power between 2011 and 2013.58
The crucial outcome of the agreement and the negotiation
process was that Iran agreed to delay its process of uranium
enrichment, keeping the level of enrichment well below that needed to
produce nuclear weapons and allowing full access and monitoring of
its facilities to the IAEA experts.59 In addition to full monitoring, the
IAEA was permitted to deploy cybersleuthing, install particle sensors,
collect samples from known nuclear development sites, and assist in
the unofficial monitoring coming from Israel and the United States.60
Any noncompliance or denial of access to the monitors and other
IAEA staff was agreed to be referred to a Joint Commission that could,
by a majority of votes, reimpose sanctions under the so-called
snapback provisions.61 Unlike U.N. Security Council resolution 1929,
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, passed after the adoption of
the JCPOA, made the development of the ballistic missile program
legal with the embargo on the development of ballistic missiles capable
of using a nuclear warhead substituted by the declaration, “Iran is
called upon not to undertake any activities related to development of
ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons . . . until the
date eight years from JCPOA Adoption date.”62
In neither Iran nor the United States has there been a broad
consensus among the policy stakeholders that entering into the
JCPOA was the right course of action. Among U.S. foreign policy
57
See Max Fisher, The real reasons Iran is so committed to its nuclear program, VOX
(Feb 25, 2015), https://www.vox.com/2015/2/25/8101383/iran-nuclear-reasons.
58
Bijan Khajehpour, Iran’s Economic Suffering, ASPEN INST. ITALIA (2012).
59
FARHAD REZAEI, IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE NUCLEAR DEAL
27–29 (2019).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62
U.N. S.C. Res. 2231, annex B, ¶ 3 (July 20, 2015).
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stakeholders, there seems to be a consensual view of the sanctions as
a “core instrument of national power.”63 However, different U.S.
administrations have had a different view of what constitutes the
demonstration of national power. The Obama administration believed
that the JCPOA struck a fair balance between Iran’s desire to pursue a
nuclear program and a limitation of its future nuclear military capability
and that sanctions as such have served the purpose of coercing Iran to
the agreement.64 In contrast, the U.S. Republican Party, influenced by
powerful Washington lobbyists,65 viewed the JCPOA as an agreement
that simply allowed Iran to prolong the uranium enrichment needed to
produce nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles for ten to fifteen years.66
This is why, during the last stages of the JCPOA negotiations, fortyseven congresspersons sent a letter to their Iranian counterparts stating
that, as an executive agreement, the agreement can be struck down by
a stroke of the pen, and urged them not to adopt it.67 Such a lack of
support in the Congress meant that the United States would accede to
the JCPOA as an executive agreement of the United States President
and not a treaty, whose ratification by the president would require an
unfeasible legislative procedure.68 Such a distinction meant that the
treaty was no more than a political commitment making its eventual

Nephew, supra note 53, at 144.
The Historic Deal That Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon,
OBAMA
WHITE
HOUSE
ARCHIVE,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal (last visited
Apr. 19, 2022).
65 See DENNIS C. JETT, THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL: BOMBS, BUREAUCRATS,
AND BILLIONAIRES 42–122 (2017) (providing an overview of the efforts of lobbyists
both supporting and opposing the deal).
66
Sarah Begley, Donald Trump’s Speech to AIPAC Members, TIME MAGAZINE,
http://time.com/4267058/donald-trump-aipac-speech-transcript/ (last accessed
Mar. 12, 2022); Jerome H. Kahan, Revisiting the Iran Nuclear Deal, 61 ORBIS 109
(2017).
67
Peter Baker, G.O.P. Senators’ Letter to Iran About Nuclear Deal Angers White
House,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
9,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/world/asia/white-house-faults-gopsenators-letter-to-irans-leaders.html; Mark Fitzpatrick, Assessing the JCPOA, 57
ADELPHI SERIES, no. 466–467, 2017, at 19.
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Jack L. Goldsmith, & Eric A. Posner, International Agreements: Rational
Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 113 (2003).
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future cancellation easier.69 What also allowed such a move was the
failure of the Obama Administration to require that the U.N. Security
Council bind states (including the United States) not to impose
sanctions on Iran unless there is clear non-compliance with the
JCPOA. Thus, after the conclusion of the JCPOA, the Council only
lifted the U.N. sanctions but did not mandate that the United States
end its sanctions.70
Whether the United States made a diplomatic effort to
renegotiate the JCPOA in the period between Trump’s inauguration in
early 2017 and May 2018, when the JCPOA was cancelled, is unclear
at this point.71 What is clear is the existence of fears that Iran would
not commence its civilian nuclear program but rather buy time and
attempt a “breakout” from the deal after a few years, which would
afford Iran enough time to acquire military nuclear capability. The
lifting of the sanctions, however, did not create economic
opportunities for U.S. businesses because the extensive network of
prohibitions enacted by the Congress during the decades of hostility
with Iran has remained in place.72
Thus, in mid-2018, after failing to certify Iran’s obligation
toward the states’ parts of the JCPOA, the United States unilaterally
withdrew from the treaty, announcing reimposition of the sanctions
toward Iran.73 By doing so, Trump’s administration did not violate the

69
This can be seen as a crucial development that led to it being removed.
See Jamil N. Jaffer, Elements of Its Own Demise: Key Flaws in the Obama Administration’s
Domestic Approach to the Iran Nuclear Agreement, 51 CASE WEST. R. J. INT’L L. 77 (2019).
70
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 14, at 1242.
71 See Koh, supra note 2, 443–47 nn. 132–134 (providing an overview of news
reports and speculations of this issue).
72 See Meredith Rathbone et al., Sanctions, Sanctions Everywhere: Forging Path
Through Complex Transnational Sanctions Laws, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1055, 1081–93 (2013)
(providing an overview of the extensive U.S. sanctions toward Iran that were
operational before the cancellation of the JCPOA).
73
Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned, N.Y. TIMES (May 8,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-irannuclear-deal.html.
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JCPOA, for the treaty’s sunset provisions74 envisaged no sanction in
case the United States withdrew from it, nor did it violate U.S.
domestic law.75 Following the withdrawal, the president reactivated the
complex legal and financial mechanism of isolation of the Iranian
economy and regime.76 The move was not greeted with support
outside of the United States77, and this lack of support would mean
that the sanctions were to remain unilateral and considered as
illegitimate and illegal by most in the global community. Challenging
them legally, however, was, and still is, a very complex matter.
C. Challenging the sanctions before the U.S. courts and international
fora
1. Presumption against extra-territoriality and U.S. sanctions
legislation
One of the basic presumptions for understanding the
application of legislation enacted by the United States Congress is that
Congress legislates primarily with domestic concerns in mind.78 This
means that the U.S. courts presume the U.S. laws are not to be applied
extraterritorially unless there is a clear legislative intent of the lawmaker
for such an application. This doctrine, stemming from the Charming
Betsy canon of decisions79 and the 1909 case, American Banana Co. v.
See Robert J. Goldston, Iran after sunset, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS (Apr. 25, 2018), https://thebulletin.org/2018/04/iran-after-sunset/
(explaining the sunset provisions of the JCPOA treaty).
75
Josh Rubin, No, Making the Iran Deal a Treaty Wouldn’t Have Stopped Trump
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It,
JUST
SECURITY,
(May
25,
2018)
https://www.justsecurity.org/56999/no-making-iran-deal-treaty-wouldnt-stoppedtrump-withdrawing/.
76
See Lesley Wroughton & Parisa Hafezi, U.S. reimposes Iran sanctions, Tehran
decries ‘bullying’, REUTERS (Nov 5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usairan-sanctions-idUSKCN1NA0ZR.
77
See Hassan Rouhani, World leaders react to US withdrawal from Iranian nuclear
deal,
AL
JAZEERA
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9,
2018),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/5/9/world-leaders-react-to-uswithdrawal-from-iranian-nuclear-deal
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EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
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against extraterritoriality as a form of statutory interpretation of US law).
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United Fruit Co.80, was reaffirmed by the 1991 EEOC .v Arabian
American Oil Co.81, finding its refinement in the “two-step” tests
established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the relatively newer Morrison
and RJR Nabisco v. European Community cases.82 The first step is to
inquire whether the presumption against extraterritoriality is rebutted,
and if not, whether the case involves a domestic application of the
statute by looking at the “focus of the statute.”83 But, when U.S. courts
look at the focus of the statute they do so to assess legislative intent
because Congress is “likely to have superior informational and
technical expertise on how to make [a] determination whether a statute
should have extraterritorial application.”84
Stopping the statute “at the border” might have useful
implications for Congress allowing to legislate with little but domestic
concerns in mind. However, some finer aspects of the reasoning of the
court and the composition of the majorities that upheld each one of
these decisions gave some observers ground to believe that, following
a string of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that reinterpreted the
presumption against extraterritoriality in a more narrow way,85 future
conservative justice appointees might be more inclined to overturn the
decisions guiding the principles of review of extraterritorial application
of the statutes.86 After all, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, a
case on the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws, the U.S.
Supreme Court concluded that “the practice of using international law
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909)
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); Larry Kramer,
Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179
(1991).
82
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); RJR Nabisco
Inc. v. European Community 579 U.S. 325 (2016).
83
William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Two Steps, 110
AJIL UNBOUND 45 (2017).
84
RYNGAERT, supra note 55, at 70 n. 122.
85
These decisions are the U.S. Supreme Court judgments in the Morrison,
Nabisco, and Kiobel cases. See Austen L. Parrish, Fading Extraterritoriality and
Isolationism: Developments in the United States, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 207
(2017) (providing the development of the argument on this basis generally).
86
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to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly established in our
jurisprudence.”87
However, this maxim does not seem to apply to the legislative
provisions of the sanctions and their secondary effects, as defined in
U.S. legislation. Explaining jurisdictional reasonableness, the
Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law (2018) makes it clear
that “[i]nterference with the sovereign authority of foreign states may
be reasonable if application of federal law would serve the legitimate
interests of the United States.”88 This is why, despite a plethora of
instances in which the Office for Foreign Asset Control and the U.S.
Department of Justice have issued fines for the breach of sanctions,
no court cases challenging these decisions have been initiated.89 A
recent attempt to challenge the extraterritorial application of U.S. law
regarding sanctions came in a criminal proceeding against Reza Zarrab,
a businessman who developed a network of shell companies and
businesses to help trade between Turkey and Iran, thus violating U.S.
sanctions against Iran.90
Zarrab’s defense argued that the case represents “a
prosecutorial overreach of the first order” because the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act applies only to U.S. persons and
that the jurisdictional nexus cannot be based solely on the fact that
some of the transactions were conducted in U.S. dollars.91 The court,
however, rejected the motion to dismiss the indictment by reaffirming
RYNGAERT, supra note 55, at 75.
Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 405 cmt. b (Am. L. Inst.
2018); William S. Dodge, Jurisdiction in the Fourth Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 18
Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 143 (2017).
89
David Restrepo Amariles & Matteo Winkler, U.S. Economic Sanctions and
the Corporate Compliance of Foreign Banks, 51 INT’L LAW. 497 (2018). See REFINITIV,
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that
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OFAC
Sanctions,
https://www.refinitiv.com/content/dam/marketing/en_us/documents/infograph
ics/fines-for-banks-that-breached-us-sanctions-infographic.pdf (last accessed Mar.
12, 2022) (providing a detailed overview of fines).
90
Indictment, United States v. Zarrab, No. 1:15-cr-00867 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 15, 2015).
91
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(S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2016).
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that the transfer of funds from a U.S. bank is understood to mean the
“exportation of a service.”92 In so doing, the court found that assertion
of jurisdiction by the U.S. government does not constitute an issue of
extraterritorial application of U.S. law but rather of the territorial
constitution of jurisdiction via the link established through the U.S.
dollar transactions, thus removing the dilemma of extraterritorial
application of U.S. law altogether.93 Thus, in the strictest sense the
Zarrab case is not a precedent because it did not answer the question
of whether Zarrab is a “U.S. person” within the sense of the sanction
legislation and because—since the trial ended in a plea bargain with the
defendant cooperating with the U.S. Department of Justice—the
appellate courts did not hear the case.94
Such a stance of the U.S. courts explains the reluctance of
corporate entities to challenge the sanctions before U.S. courts. We
can be safe in concluding that the courts would find that Congress
intended provisions of this legislation to apply extraterritorially despite
the fact that the criminal proceedings in Zarrab v U.S. are the only
instance where the presumption of extraterritoriality solely regarding
sanctions has been tested before the courts.95 Even if the court would
ignore the criteria of the two-step test of the focus and the intent of
the statutes, whether the behavior of an individual or a company
“touched or concerned” the United States “with a sufficient force”
would remain important.96
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United States v. Zarrab, No. 15 Cr. 867 (RMB) 2016 WL 6820737, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2016).
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2017).
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Originally developed as a part of the effects doctrine, it was
further refined in Kiobel v. Dutch Petroleum97 in which the court relied on
the presumption of extraterritoriality in declining to recognize that
federal statutes may be applicable to violations of a customary
international law.98 Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts concluded
that the behavior that “touches or concerns” the United States with
“sufficient force” may exclude the presumption of extraterritoriality of
the statute.99 This echoes the Restatement’s comment that “[i]f
whatever is the focus of the provision occurred in the United States,
then application of the provision is considered domestic and is
permitted.”100
2. Challenging the sanctions before international adjudication
bodies
In its opposition to U.S. secondary sanctions, the EU has
clearly stated, both in the 1990s and in 2018, that “by their extraterritorial application, such instruments violate international law.”101
But in the 1990s, though the EU was in the position to initiate
proceedings before the dispute settlement bodies of the WTO, these
were ended by an amicable settlement in which the United States
suspended the application of sanctions in exchange for more alignment
of the EU countries toward the strengthening of the transatlantic

eds. forthcoming 2019) (Ind. Legal Studies Res. Paper No. 408),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3369847.
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Amending the Annex to Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96 Protecting Against
the Effects of Extra-Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third
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wider discussion concerning the approach of international law to sanctions on a
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partnership.102 This is in stark contrast to the situation during Trump’s
presidency in which the WTO found itself under attack from an U.S.
administration, which wants to renegotiate or withdraw from this
international institution.103 By vetoing the appointment of members of
the dispute settlement bodies of the WTO, this organization is
prevented from resolving disputes. But even if it were operational, it is
very doubtful whether its dispute resolution mechanism would help to
overcome this problem because the United States opposes one of its
key recent interpretations, the security exception. The security
exception clause contained in Article XXI of the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariff (GATT) holds that states may invoke trade
barriers for security reasons.104 In one of its recent decisions, the panel
of the dispute settlement body found that the application of such an
exception can be reviewed by the WTO.105 Contrary to this, the United
States contends that security exceptions are unilateral and
discretional.106 Even if a case against the United States would be
brought before the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, it is doubtful
there would be—at least under an administration that wanted a
comprehensive reform of the organization—compliance with a
decision that would go against U.S. interests and interpretation of this
clause. Therefore, the WTO cannot serve as an international forum in
which the effects of the U.S. sanctions could be legally reviewed and,
in any event, the WTO agreements do not contain a clause explicitly
binding the secondary sanctions despite a “gut feeling” that there must
be something illegal about them.107

102
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Could the International Court of Justice (ICJ) be the venue of
last resort? Iran has challenged the sanctions, their effect, and the
unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA, claiming
such behavior violates a 1955 agreement on friendship between Iran
and the United States before the International Court of Justice.108 But,
since Iran challenges the legality of the sanctions on the basis of a treaty
and not on the grounds of violation of customary international law,109
it is unclear whether the resolution of the case would offer a review of
the legality of the sanctions. In October 2018, the Court issued a
preliminary order against the United States under which the country is
to refrain from preventing the import of food, medicine, agriculture
commodities, spare parts, and other equipment and services necessary
for the safety and maintenance of civil aviation to Iran.110 With the final
resolution of the adjudication at least a few years away, there is a small
degree of certainty that the court proceeding would settle the matter
between the two countries, especially given the United States’ history
of noncompliance with the court’s orders and judgments.111 In any
event, in October 2018, the United States withdrew from the Treaty of
Amity with Iran, which could effectively undermine the jurisdiction of
the ICJ in the case, as it stemmed from Article XXI of the treaty.112
Thus, the international legal system cannot provide us with a
clear answer on the question of legality and scope of unilateral
sanctions that go beyond the scope of a U.N. Security Councilimposed sanctions regime. The issue remains contentious in
international law. Authors observe that the word “sanction” is not an
international legal term but rather a term widely accepted as a
countermeasure against the behavior of a state seen as illegal or
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110
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illegitimate.113 But, whether measures that are meant to, for example,
limit the state’s ability to trade in oil and gas conform to the principle
of proportionality in international law in comparison to the alleged
violations of nuclear non-proliferation remain something to be
tested.114 Additionally, the international legal system lacks standards to
determine which illegitimate, hostile, or dangerous behaviors should
be repressed by sanctions and whether sovereign states have a right to
be free from economic coercion.115 Thus, given the vast scope of the
effects of U.S. secondary sanctions, it seems that a state representing
the interests of its own traders and exporters unable to trade with Iran
would have a greater chance of succeeding before an international
forum. However, neither has such an action been undertaken nor does
it seem realistic.116
D. The EU’s response to U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA and to
secondary sanctions
Believing that the JCPOA and its commitments should be
honored, the EU took measures to protect the deal. It responded to
the anticipated effects of secondary U.S. sanctions by establishing the
Instrument in Support of Trade Exchange (INSTEX), a special
purpose vehicle designed to facilitate trade in goods exempt from U.S.
sanctions.117 It also re-invoked the EU Blocking Regulation originally
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preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), (Jan 31, 2019)
https://instex-europe.com/about-us/founding-statement/
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enacted to counter U.S. sanctions against Cuba in 1996 by punishing
corporate EU entities complying with the sanctions.118
INSTEX was supposed to operate as a barter mechanism; it
would not process direct payments to Iranian banks or commercial
entities but operate as a clearinghouse.119 This means that, for example,
a hypothetical EU exporter of medical goods to Iran receives payments
from the importer of Iranian goods to the EU while the Iranian
importer of medical goods receives payments from the exporter of
Iranian goods. The role of INSTEX as a special-purpose vehicle is
merely the coordinator of such payments.120 The United States warned
against the usage of INSTEX and also expanded the scope of its
sanctions by designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) as a terrorist organization and banning trade with different
sectors of Iranian industry, including all military, oil, insurance,
financial, energy, shipping, shipbuilding, port operating, and metal
producing sectors and metal-related products.121 By this, the risk of
non-compliance with U.S. sanctions became even greater as many
Iranian entities are under IRGC control. Even before these events,
many high-profile law firms and business advisory services advised
their clients to refrain from doing business with Iran, citing risks of
U.S. sanctions as the main reason.122 The extension of the U.S.
The EU Blocking Regulation itself was inspired by the previous
opposition of regulators in EU member states to the extraterritorial effects of U.S.
antitrust law of the 1980s. See Edward Gordon, Trends: Extraterritorial Application of
United States Economic Laws: Britain Draws the Line, 14 INT’L LAW. 151 (1980);
Developments in the Law: Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1255 (2011).
119
Mazahir Bootwala, The Iran problem: an evaluation of US sanctions on Iran and
global reactions, 21 GEO. J. OF INT’L. AFF. 136, 138 (2020).
120 See generally Grégoire Mallard et al., The Humanitarian Gap in the Global
Sanctions Regime: Assessing Causes, Effects, and Solutions, 26 GLOB. GOV. 121 (2020)
(providing an overview of the mechanism that allows the functionality of INSTEX).
121 U.S. Officially Designates Iran’s Revolutionary Guards a Terrorist Group,
REUTERS (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran/u-sofficially-designates-irans-revolutionary-guards-a-terrorist-groupidUSKCN1RR1BE.
122
Satish M. Kini et al., U.S. Sanctions v. EU Blocking Regulation: Conflicting
Landscape Poses Challenge for Compliance, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2018/10/us-sanctions-v-eublocking-regulation; Adam Smith et al., The “New” Iran E.O. and the “New” EU
Blocking Statute—Navigating the Divide for International Business, GIBSON DUNN (Aug. 9,
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sanctions to the Central Bank of Iran created insecurity in the circles
of EU institutions on whether INSTEX and its members might find
themselves the target of the U.S. sanctions, which led to continuous
delays in the beginning of INSTEX operations.123 Initially expected to
start operating in mid-2019,124 INSTEX’s first two transactions
occurred only in April 2020.125 However, INSTEX transactions
remained limited to humanitarian goods such as food and medicine.126
The establishment of INSTEX did not help EU companies
escape a particular position of inter-legality127; if they comply with U.S.
sanctions they will be targeted by EU law, but if they ignore U.S.
sanctions they risk losing access to U.S. financial markets and
enormous fines. Because compliance with EU Blocking Regulations is
legislated by the individual EU member states, the fines and regulation
of noncompliance greatly varied with some countries, such as the
United Kingdom, regulating as criminal offences, others, such as Italy,
regulating them as administrative offences and some, such as France
and Luxembourg, not regulating them at all.128 Notwithstanding these
differences, compliance with the U.S. sanctions presented a much
lower risk than compliance with the Blocking Regulation. These are

2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/new-iran-e-o-and-new-eu-blocking-statutenavigating-the-divide-for-international-business/.
123
Maria Aftalion, INSTEX, A GAME CHANGER? 9 (Vienna Center for
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 2020) available at https://www.
nonproliferation.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/Marie-Aftalion-INSTEXPaper_Final-1. pdf.
124
Laurence Norman, Europeans Plan to Inject Capital into Iranian Trade Effort,
WALL STREET J. (Jun. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/europeans-plan-toinject-capital-into-iranian-trade-effort-11561590898.
125
Alexandra Brzozowski, EU’s INSTEX Mechanism Facilitates First
Transaction with Pandemic-Hit
Iran, EURACTIV (Apr.
1,
2020),
https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eus-instex-mechanismfacilitates-first-transaction-with-pandemic-hit-iran/.
126
Aftalion supra note 123 at 9.
127
THE CHALLENGE OF INTERLEGALITY (Jan Klabbers & Gianluigi
Palombella eds., 2019).
128
Justine Walker, The EU Blocking Regulation – Issues and Considerations for the
Financial
Services
Sector,
UK
FINANCE
(July
11,
2018),
https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/system/files/UK-Finance-paper-EU-BlockingRegulation-11-July-2018-FINAL.pdf.
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the reasons why the mere reannouncement of sanctions stopped
almost all major foreign investment operations in Iran.129
Therefore, the enactment of the Blocking Statute and the
inception of INSTEX did little to ensure that the EU companies are
safe from U.S. retaliation; they were more of a signal to the Iranian
government that the EU is willing to uphold its obligations to JCPOA
and that, likewise, it expects Iran to do the same.130 Perhaps sensing a
willingness of the EU to concede more ground to preserve the deal,
Iran announced that it would withdraw from the JCPOA unless
constraints on its financial sector were loosened.131 To this, the EU
responded with demands that Iran comply with the demands made by
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international standardsetting body in the field of banking regulations pertaining to money
laundering and banking regulations that repeatedly warned Iran due to
its support of terrorist organizations.132 As we will see in Part III, on
the one hand, Iran did not withdraw from the JCPOA, opting instead
to legitimize its position using the increasing enrichment of uranium
as a leverage for more lenient standards from the EU toward trade with
Iran.133 Compliance with FATF, (which blacklisted Iran in February
2020) meant significant changes to the legislative framework of the
Iranian financial system necessary to enable the country’s leading

129
See DAVID ADESNIK & SAEED GHASSEMINEJAD, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN IRAN: MULTINATIONAL FIRMS’ COMPLIANCE WITH US SANCTIONS
(Foundation
for
Defense
of
Democracies
2018),
available
at
https://www.fdd.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/MEMO_CompaniesinIran.pd
f.
130
Ellie Geranmayeh, Deputy Director, European Council on Foreign
Relations, Speech at the Expert Dialogue on the EU Blocking Regulation and
Extraterritorial U.S. Sanctions (Apr. 18, 2019).
131
Patrick Wintour, Iran announces partial withdrawal from nuclear deal,
GUARDIAN
(May
8,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/07/iran-to-announces-partialwithdrawal-from-nuclear-deal.
132
Global watchdog gives Iran till June to comply with anti-money laundering rules,
MIDDLE
EAST
MONITOR
(Jan.
23,
2019),
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190223-global-watchdog-gives-iran-tilljune-to-comply-with-anti-money-laundering-rules/.
133 See infra, Part III.
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exporters to stop doing business on the black market.134 Iran’s
reluctance to comply with FATF demands had to do with the
insecurity of the Iranian authorities regarding the value of such an
operation. Whatever was done, it was feared, could be undermined by
U.S. lobbying within FATF itself, which would prevent Iran from
being delisted. Thus, Iran would give away the funding of Iranian
regional allies, such as Hezbollah, without gaining anything in return.135
INSTEX’s limitation on trade exempt from U.S. sanctions
meant that Iran’s trade in oil, its main export product, remained
excluded from the system. The only option to continue oil trade with
Iran was to avoid the use of the global banking system and U.S.
currency. This confirmed the unchallenged status of the dollar as a
global reserve currency but also a currency of choice in international
trade and the source of strength of the U.S. financial sanctions.136
Although leading European politicians spoke of the need to promote
the euro as a currency of international trade, and despite Iranian efforts
to develop cryptocurrencies to bypass the effects of U.S. sanctions on
its financial sector,137 the relevance of the dollar has not been
undermined. Thus, it seemed that what was left to Iran was to trade
with the countries that would either use barter or payment
mechanisms, thus bypassing the global effect of U.S. financial
sanctions, or use intermediaries that would willingly break sanctions
and risk U.S. prosecution in exchange for huge fees. The former was
the case with China, which had more opportunities to continue trade
with Iran because some of its banks were not exposed to the U.S.
financial markets,138 and the latter with Turkish Halkbank, which found
134
Steven Terner, Does Iran want to be removed from the FATF blacklist?, GULF
STATE ANALYTICS (Apr. 1, 2021), https://gulfstateanalytics.com/does-iran-want-tobe-removed-from-the-fatf-blacklist/
135
James M. Dorsey, Iran and North Korea Highlight Pitfalls of Trump’s
“Maximum Pressure” Strategy, BESA (Mar. 4, 2019), https://besacenter.org/irannorth-korea-trump/.
136
Joshua P. Zoffer, The Dollar and the United States’ Exorbitant Power to
Sanction, 113 AM. J. INI’L L. UNBOUND 152 (2019).
137
SHERRI SCOTT, CRYPTOCURRENCY COMPLIANCE: AN AML
PERSPECTIVE 8 (2018).
138
Elli Geranmayeh & Maneul L. Rapnouil, Meeting the Challenge of Secondary
Sanctions, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jun. 25, 2019),
https://ecfr.eu/publication/meeting_the_challenge_of_secondary_sanctions/.
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itself under OFAC investigation for facilitating up to US $20 billion in
payments toward Iran.139
III. COERCING IRAN: AN INSIGHT INTO THE
DEALMAKING WORLD OF DONALD TRUMP
A. The United States’ demands on Iran
Once the United States withdrew from JCPOA, Trump’s
administration was faced with a much more difficult task: getting Iran
to re-negotiate its status as a regional power and its military deterrence
capabilities. The United States’ demands may be divided into three
groups: 1) those dealing with Iran’s support of the regional and global
activities of paramilitary organizations and the development of its own
military capabilities, 2) those dealing with Iran’s nuclear capabilities,
and 3) those focused on detainees and unneighborly relations.140 The
first group of demands contained mandates to end the proliferation of
ballistic missiles; cease supporting Hezbollah, Shia militias in Iraq, and
Houthi rebels in Yemen; limit the global activities of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps, especially its Quds units; and withdraw
forces from Syria.141 The second group included demands to effectively
limit the development of Iran’s nuclear program altogether by turning
off the hard water reactor and granting unlimited access to IAEA
inspectors.142 The third group required Iran to release all U.S. and
foreign nationals and stop the threats and use of force, including
cyberattacks, against neighbors.143 The officials of the administration
referred to the measures contained in the sanctions’ regime as well as
the aggressive public relations strategy aimed at both the domestic

139
U.S. Superseding Indictment at 3, United States v. Turkiye Halk Bankasi
A.S., S6 15 Cr. 857 (RMB).
140
Mike Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State, After the Deal: A New Iran
Strategy (May 21, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/after-the-dealnew-iran-strategy .
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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constituency and the Iranian citizens as the “maximum pressure
strategy.”144
The opposition to these demands from Iran was not the only
high-risk aspect of this approach. Rather, what was specific to these
actions was that they were taken in negation of the previous
negotiation strategy vis-à-vis Iran that, from 2003 onwards, was never
solely an Iran–United States affair but always had an international
component.145 As we have seen, the functionality of the sanctions
relied on global compliance and the unilaterality of the U.S. approach
of both pressuring and negotiating with Iran caused a rift with the
traditional U.S. allies. Demands toward Iran, particularly those
concerning ballistic missile capabilities as Iran’s ultimate military
deterrent, can be understood as challenges to Iran’s sovereignty. Even
if Iran was to give in to the U.S. demands to cease its support of the
rebels in Yemen or Shia militias in Iraq, sole guarantees from the
United States would hardly be enough to secure the stabilization of the
region. Such distrust of the Iranian leaders towards the U.S. led them
to believe that the true intention of these actions in exchange for
suspension of the sanctions was to overthrow the Iranian regime and
not stabilize the region.146 This, however, did create a rift within Iran.
While President Rouhani supported compliance with FATF
regulations, the Iranian parliament controlled by the Iranian religious
elite did not have the majority needed to pass the legislative changes
demanded by FATF.147
Thus, Iran rejected the demands and characterized the U.S.
maximum pressure campaign as an attempt to “Sovietize Iran” by
isolating it and making it more vulnerable to domestic rifts. The
maximum pressure campaign itself was, aside from the sanctions, very
risky, as it seemed clear that it might be of limited use and indefinite
Michael R. Pompeo, Confronting Iran, 97 FOREIGN AFF. 60 (2018).
For example, Russia and the EU countries were heavily involved in the
negotations over the Iranian nuclear programme since 2003.
146 Iran says U.S. ‘action group’ will fail to overthrow Iranian state, REUTERS (Aug
19, 2018). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-idUSKBN1L4080
147
Jubin Katiraie, FATF Raises New Infighting Among Iran’s Officials, IRAN
FOCUS (Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.iranfocus.com/en/economy/34178-fatf-raisesnew-infighting-among-iran-s-officials.
144
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duration. While the JCPOA was feared to be a pathway for the Iranian
break out toward nuclear military capability, maximum pressure could
easily lead to military escalations, regional instability, and a slow but
certain loss of support for U.S.-led sanctions from the other states in
the international community. While the effects of the sanctions were
crippling, Iran had its own strategies for mitigating their effect. And
even if Iran was brought to the negotiating table, who could guarantee
that these negotiations would lead to a new deal?
In the following section, we will use the BIntLE and political
psychology to assess what drove the actions in implementing the
maximum pressure strategy and the responses to the strategy from Iran
and the international community.148
B. Behavioral Approach to International Law and Economics
As previously stated, much of the law and economics approach
to international law relies on rational choice theory, which essentially
equates rationality with perceived self-interest. But, how is self-interest
perceived by actors? The behavioral approach to international law
(BIntLE), an enriched model of the rational choice paradigm that has
informed much of the law and economics approach to international
law, aims to explain this. In so doing, it questions the legal and policy
choices of actors (states or individual decision-makers) by explaining
their actions through bounded rationality.149 Bounded rationality is a
concept developed through observations of human behavior, which,
under the influence of social preferences and cognition, deviates from

Some International Relations scholars consider the application of
political psychology vis-à-vis Trump’s behaviour and the usage of prospect theory to
be a “fool’s errand” because all his moves are reactions and his behaviour is
unpredictable and, as such, he has no bounded rationality to be analysed. See Michael
N. Barnett, What is International Relations Theory Good For?, in CHAOS IN THE LIBERAL
ORDER: THE TRUMP PRESIDENCY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9–10 (Robert Jervis et al., eds., 2018). Even if we concede
the point that the behaviour of Trump defies rationality as such, this still does not
mean that the administration’s efforts are without a traceable pattern of internal logic.
149
Tae Jung Park, Behavioral Economics in International Investment Law: Bounded
Rationality and the Choice of Reservation List Modality, 5 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 398,
(2017).
148

90

2022 Int'l Law & Politics of the Trump Administration's Iran Policy

10:2

the formal requirements of rational models.150 In the traditional law
and economics approach to international law, deviations from the
rational choice paradigm are understood as mistakes, not as behavioral
patterns.151 Rationality is, however, seen as a model, not as a
description of reality, which is why it is described as “thin
rationality.”152 BIntLE, on the other hand, wants to describe the nature
of this rationality by viewing the behavior that deviates from rational
models not as irrational mistakes but as behavioral patterns.153 In so
doing, it aims not to do away with the rational choice paradigm
altogether “but to use its improvements to inspire new theories and
empirical research about international law.”154
There are several key concepts of the behavioral approach to
international law and economics that need to be explained to fully
grasp its explanatory potential and identify its departure from the
rational choice paradigm. The first such concept is the prospect theory
developed by Tversky and Kahneman, which explains how individuals
perceive outcomes through a simplified analysis of immediate gains
and losses that can arise out of a certain decision or choice.155 But, what
counts as a gain or a loss? That depends on the reference point, which
is usually, but not necessarily, the status quo. Understanding the
reference point relies on an understanding of both the framing effect
and the endowment effect. The framing effect is the effect created by
the definition of certain information. The framing effect is used to
describe the change in people’s choices when different descriptions of
the same choice problem influence their beliefs.156 The framing of a
situation as a gain or a loss motivates different behavior from decision
150

See John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON LIT. 669, 692

(1996).
Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1099,
1122–26 (2015).
152 Id. at 1108–09.
153
Anne van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and Economics, 55 HARV.
INT’L L. J. 421 (2014).
154 Id. at 480.
155
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
under Risk, 47(2) ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
156
Anne van Aaken & Jürgen Kurtz, Beyond Rational Choice: International Trade
Law and the Behavioral Political Economy of Protectionism, 8 J. INTL ECON. L. 601, 610
(2019).
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makers. Losses and gains are not perceived evenly because they are not
perceived through the prism of their respective rational utilities. A loss
counts more than a gain, which is why when people perceive possible
gains, they tend to be risk-averse and when they perceive losses, they
tend to be more risk-oriented. Thus, the frame of a decision depends
not just on objective elements of the problem but also on the risk
propensity of an individual.
The endowment effect represents the different perceptions of
certain goods depending on whether they are possessed by an
individual or not. The perception of different reference points by states
or individuals as endowments results in differing understandings of
fairness. In international conflicts, this will lead to differing
perceptions of distributional issues.157
Also important is whether one presents a hawkish bias, which
represents an inclination toward less cooperation and conflict
resolution, marked by more aggressive, imposing behavior.158 It leads
to differences in the perception of threats coming from adverse actors
and to reactions more likely to produce unnecessary conflict. Those
susceptible to hawkish biases are confident of winning a conflict.159
When negotiating, they view negotiations as having distributive effects
and not as a tool for creation of value.160

van Aaken, supra note 153, at 463.
I describe these three concepts in detail as they are prescient of my
analysis, but they are far from being the only concepts existing in BIntLE. In fact,
the literature referenced herein identifies many other related concepts.
159
van Aaken & Kurtz, supra note 156, at 611.
160
Daniel Kahneman & Jonathan Renshon, Why Hawks Win, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Oct. 13, 2009), https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/13/why-hawks-win/.
157
158
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The use of BIntLE has been, unlike the application of the
behavioral approach in international relations,161 recent and sporadic.162
Its primary value has been recognized in its potential to influence
lawmakers and policy developers to create solutions that would inform
treaty design and lead to greater compliance with international law.163
However, van Aaken and Broude, as the primary developers of
BIntLE, do not, believe that those are the limits to the method, but
that it may serve to open up grounds for an empirical analysis of
international law in different areas, including the behavior of individual
stakeholders, domestic legislation,164 negotiation,165 and international
cooperation.166 Thus, it has also recently been used to map some recent
trends in international law, like explaining the Trump administration’s
tariff policy as a communication strategy toward voters in international
trade law.167

See WILLIAM A. BOETCHER III, PRESIDENTIAL RISK BEHAVIOUR IN
FOREIGN POLICY: PRUDENCE OR PERIL? (Palgrave Macmillan 2005); see also Jack S.
Levy, Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical
Problems, 13 POLIT. PSYCHOL. 283 (1992); Robert Jervis, Political Implications of Loss
Aversion, 13 POLIT. PSYCHOL. 187 (1992); Robert Jervis, The Implications of Prospect
Theory for Human Nature and Values, 25 POLIT. PSYCHOL. 163 (2004); ROSE
MCDERMOTT, POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Univ. of
Michigan Press 2004).
162 See Cedric Ryngaert, Domestic Criminal Accountability for Dutch Corporations
Profiting from North Korean Forced Labour (2018) in Remco E. Breuker and Imke B.L.H.
Van Gardinen (eds.) People For Profit North Korean
Forced Labour on a Global Scale 204,205. (using BintLE to explain the absence of
prosecutions of crimes against humanity committed against perpetrators of North
Korean slave labour).
163
Armin Steinbach, The Trend towards Non-Consensualism in Public International
Law: A (Behavioural) Law and Economics Perspective, 27(3) EUR. J. INT’L L. 643, 660
(2016);
164
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been used in assessing domestic legislation. See e.g., EYAL ZAMIR, LAW,
PSYCHOLOGY, AND MORALITY: THE ROLE OF LOSS AVERSION 138–42 (2015).
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(Sep.
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167
van Aaken & Kurtz, supra note 153, at 616.
161

93

2022

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

10:2

C. The Framing Effect of Trump’s Administration View of
International Law and Policy
President Trump viewed the JCPOA as “one of the worst and
most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into.”168
This statement seems consistent with his approach to foreign policy.
Since the early 1980s, Trump has had a strong interest in foreign policy
and in raising awareness of the situations in which other countries can
take advantage of the United States.169 His views on Iran, in particular,
were informed by one of the most traumatic events of U.S. foreign
policy, the hostage crisis of 1979.170 Notably, Trump referenced the
hostage crisis of 1979 threatening that, in the event of a further military
escalation, he would order destruction of fifty-two Iranian cultural
monuments, symbolizing every U.S. hostage taken in 1979.171 Coupled
with an assumption that Iran would violate its commitments and
continue to enrich uranium and become capable of building nuclear
weapons, this adversarial view towards Iran framed Trump’s decisionmaking. Certainly, an element of “speaking to the base”—the senators
and donors of the Republican Party who have strongly opposed the
deal—was also present in this decision.172 At the same time, we should
not ignore the wider legal and political context in which the decision
was made. The re-enactment of sanctions was followed by a vivid
public relations campaign targeting the domestic audience dubbed the

168
Mark Landler & David E. Sanger, Trump Disavows Nuclear Deal, but Doesn’t
Scrap
It,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
13,
2017)
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html.
169
ALLEN SALKIN, THE METHOD TO THE MADNESS: DONALD TRUMP’S
ASCENT AS TOLD BY THOSE WHO WERE HIRED, FIRED, INSPIRED--AND
INAUGURATED 7–10 (2019).
170
In fact, of the first publicly stated foreign policy views of Donald Trump
was that of the Iran hostage crisis. See BRENDAN SIMMS & CHARLIE LADERMAN,
DONALD TRUMP: THE MAKING OF A WORLD VIEW 18–19 (2017)
171 See Evan Semones, Trump vows to target ‘52’ sites if Iran retaliates for Soleimani
death,
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(Jan.
4,
2020),
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“maximum pressure campaign.173“ Since the United States under
Trump seems to be pursuing a selective engagement strategy, by
limiting its involvement in global affairs to strategic areas such as
Eurasia, the Middle East, and the Far East,174 Trump’s stance toward
Iran as a part of this global approach was important. The traditional
law and economics approach argues that the “three Rs” (reputation,
reciprocity, and retaliation) lead to greater compliance with
international law.175 The framing of the JCPOA as a negative reference
point, however, led to exactly opposite actions; it was U.S.
abandonment of the JCPOA that improved the United and the Trump
administration’s reputation. In any event, Trump’s admission that he
is an “American nationalist,” also shared by some of his key staff
members, including his national security advisors,176 expresses the
realist theories of domestic and international law. Since the late 1980s,
all administrations have been influenced to a certain extent by a realist
strain of thinking about international law and foreign policy, embodied
in the recourse to unilateral actions177 as well as the application of the
Unitary Executive Theory to foreign policy. Unitary Executive Theory
views the president, as the head of the executive branch, as less bound
in decision-making concerning the engagement of U.S. troops and
intelligence abroad, then in domestic policy.178 Such a stance is
explained through the executive branch’s superior knowledge and its
ability to reach swift and flexible decisions.179 As I have argued in Part
I, there is no doubt that the U.S. president had the authority to cancel
173
Mohammed Nuruzzaman, President Trump’s ‘Maximum Pressure’
Campaign and Iran’s Endgame. 44 Strategic Analysis 6 (2020): 570-582.
174
JOHN DAVIS, TRUMP’S WORLD: PERIL AND OPPORTUNITY IN US
FOREIGN POLICY AFTER OBAMA 171 (2019).
175
ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 33 (2008).
176
For an overview of national security advisors of the Trump
administration, see Dov S. Zakheim, Can Trump Take Advice?, CTR. FOR INT’L REL. &
SUSTAINABLE DEV., https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2020issue-no-15/can-trump-take-advice (last visited Mar. 12, 2022).
177 See DAVID M. MALONE & YUEN FOONG KHONG, UNILATERALISM AND
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 8–10 (2003).
178
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the JCPOA as it was a political commitment. At the same time, some
of the realist international law proponents’ views have strengthened
his decision. As in, “The Limits of International Law”180 or “Is There
Really Law in International Affairs,”181 the approach sees international
law as not impacting the behavior of states other than through a
rational choice paradigm. The law’s efficiency, which is crucial for the
economic approach to law generally, is absent in international affairs,
and the interests of states are best protected through unilateral actions.
Doctrinally, this line of reasoning comes from the economic analysis
of law, which views international law as an incomplete contract freed
from normative preferences that would inform us for what it should
be used.182 Due to the lack of a global world government, international
law cannot establish any kind of rule of law because it lacks a
constituency.183 As unitary actors, only states are the true subjects of
international law. The intellectual roots of this school of thought lie in
the realist view of international relations and are inextricably linked
with the works of Hans Morgenthau184—itself developed much as a
skeptical response to the failures of international law to prevent the
escalation of war in the period between the two world wars.185
Therefore, to take the tenets of the behavioral approach to
international law and economics as an explanation for the actions of
the Trump administration is to explain them in their own terms—as
actors that view rationality as the self-interest of states bounded by
information, time, and cognitive frameworks that strive for
independence from, not interdependence with, other states. Applied
to the case of the cancellation of the JCPOA, such an approach to
international law would argue—just like the Republican senators—that
international law and its instruments lack the power to coerce Iran into

GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4.
John Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?, 10
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respecting non-nuclear proliferation. The key provisions of the
JCPOA regarding the oversight and development of Iranian nuclear
facilities are technical and rely on expert monitoring to be conducted
by the IAEA, a multilateral organization. In choosing whether to
accept the cost of staying within the JCPOA versus the perceived
relatively low costs of exiting, the realist thinking influenced the
President to choose the latter. Exiting the agreement would mean a
chance to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Contrary to
this, staying within the JCPOA would bring two main benefits to Iran:
a chance to acquire nuclear weapons following the expiration of the
agreement and a chance to renege on its commitments by cheating.
Thus, just as the creation of JCPOA was in the transnational
legal process view of international law and policy, the withdrawal from
the JCPOA, as well as the usage of sanctions as negotiation leverage
and not weaponized interdependence, is an expression of commitment
to realist approach to international law and policy. The JCPOA was
understood as a reference point, a perceived loss, a negatively framed
standing both normatively and methodologically against the style of
international governance that President Trump and his advisors
shared. It was the deal that was abandoned by an administration that
sought to establish its reputation by re-negotiating with the world and
distancing itself from its predecessor, President Obama, viewed by
Trump as a weak dealmaker.186 Additionally, Trump’s actions were
reinforced by his advisors’ shared view of his perception of
international law and the situation regarding Iran, and thus he was not
being challenged or influenced by different opinions.187

186 New leak claims Trump scrapped Iran nuclear deal ‘to spite Obama.’, BBC NEWS
(Jul. 14, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-48978484.
187
As I will observe later, once those views began differing, Trump
responded by firing some of the advisors, in the case of Iran, John Bolton. But, the
initial framing of the JCPOA as a “bad deal” was unchallenged regardless of the
cabinet shuffles. For the importance of the influence of advisors on the worldview
of decision-makers, see ROSE MCDERMOTT, RISK-TAKING IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS: PROSPECT THEORY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 22–25 (2001).
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D. President Trump and negotiations with Iran after the cancellation
of the JCPOA
“Summery” and “positive” are how negotiation experts have
described President Trump’s approach to negotiation188 outlined in the
book he co-authored on the subject.189 Published in 1987 and 1997,
the books The Art of the Deal and The Art of the Comeback represent his
thoughts on negotiations in the real estate business, but the negotiation
experts demonstrate their validity for use in assessing his foreign policy
negotiation as well.190 The books depict an individual constantly
communicating his desires to his adversaries, business partners, and
staff. While doing so, Trump exercises different negotiating roles: an
observer who zooms in on the negotiation partner, a performer who
elevates his reputation, a controller who does not let others influence
his views, and a disruptor, prepared to do the unexpected.191 As a
negotiator, Trump primarily engages in risky behavior to coerce his
interlocutors into averting losses.192 Loss aversion was also crucial in
his understanding of the JCPOA as a deal that brings nothing to the
United States. Thus, the sanctions against Iran have been reduced
merely to the role of leverage, a primary asset of any negotiation.
Trump negotiates to establish a reputation both for himself
and the country he is leading, a reputation different from the shattered
powerless image that was, in his view, projected by his predecessor and
which led to his quest to “make America great again.” As Kurtz and
von Aaken observed, in this slogan the focus is on the word “again,”
meaning that the grandeur has been lost.193 As evidenced by his
response to different issues across the policy spectrum, such as the rise
of China, the issues concerning international trade, or building a wall
on the U.S.-Mexico border, Trump’s approach is always focused on
dealmaking. This dealmaking is not always l’art pour l’art as Trump
188
I. William Zartman, International Diplomacy after Trump, with Antecedents, 35
NEGOTIATION J. 111, 111 (2019).
189
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himself liked to claim.194 For example, in the area of trade where
Trump made the biggest apparent policy shift—from free trade to the
weaponized use of tariffs—a closer look reveals that this move is both
a negotiation tactic and an attempt to please his base—the voters of
the “rust belt” in the U.S. Midwest struck by the loss of manufacturing
jobs.195
In dealing with Iran, the messages sent by the highest U.S.
officials, including former President Trump, were focused on getting
Iran to re-negotiate its standing as a regional power in the Middle East.
Iran was to diminish its nuclear program, ballistic missile development,
and support to regional military organizations in exchange for
economic development, a presumably better global reputation, and
more certainty in international dealings.196 Threats of military use were
combined with praises of Iran as a great nation whose leaders should
just call in order to reach “a deal, a fair deal.”197 A comparison with
Trump’s behavior in the case of North Korea’s nuclear tests from 2017
reveals a similar pattern; while Trump threatened a “locked and
loaded” military, his significant diplomatic effort led to an established
rapport with the North Korean nuclear leader.198 Labelled as
“maximum pressure” and projected both as an image for a domestic
constituency and as a strong message abroad, the campaign and the
rhetoric aimed to demonstrate the willingness of the United States to
not only negotiate but also to take political and even military action.199
But in dealing with Iran, Trump miscalculated Iran’s own perceptions
of reputation.
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into Donald Trump’s political economy, 4(1) INTERDISC. POL. STUD. 47, 49 (2018).
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Although the JCPOA did not enjoy universal support in Iran,
Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA led to an increase in the plan’s
reputation in the country. Therefore, had Iran responded to Trump’s
call for negotiations, it would have created two major problems—the
problem of domestic credibility for Iran’s government and the
potential loss of international and regional standing. Instead, Iran
chose to demonstrate its willingness to stay within the JCPOA. This
enabled further diplomatic engagement from the EU which, as we
have observed, has offered to continue trade with Iran using the
mechanism of INSTEX. However, when the first short-term effects
of INSTEX failed to materialize, Iran resumed uranium enrichment,
pushing it over the limits specified by the JCPOA.200 Iran claimed that
since the EU, as a result of the sanctions, is unable to perform many
of the commitments from the deal, the EU became noncompliant,
which provides grounds for Iran to also abandon some of its
commitments.201 However, Iran did not initialize the dispute resolution
mechanism provisions of Article 36 of the JCPOA. This Article
specifies that a Joint Commission in which representatives of all sides
have one member shall decide on the breach and submit a report to
the U.N. Security Council.202 Obviously, this mechanism was created
with Iran’s and not the United States’ noncompliance in mind, as the
United States can veto any action against itself in the U.N. Security
Council. By using enrichment as a response to U.S. non-compliance,
Iran also engaged in a risky negotiation tactic. If the EU were to give
up on the creation of INSTEX, instead referring reversible enrichment
as a JCPOA violation to the U.N. Security Council, it would risk losing
what leverage it had over Iran’s behavior and would align itself with
the U.S. administration, whose behavior it sought to counter.
Additionally, Iran argued that any of its enrichment could be degraded
to a lower concentration—an assessment not disputed by the
200
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observers.203 This allowed Iran to successfully exploit the divide
between Western allies created by the unilateral acts of Trump’s
administration.
Still, this created a fear among the European countries that Iran
would, eventually, pull out of the JCPOA and pursue a nuclear
weapon. Germany, France and the UK governments responded to this
by referring Iran’s noncompliance to the dispute resolution
mechanism of the JCPOA.204 However, the committee meetings to
decide on the matter were repeatedly prolonged from January 2020
when the procedure was initiated as the EU sought more room for
diplomatic efforts.205 Aside from INSTEX, one such initiative was to
extend a credit line to Iran. The credit line was to be guaranteed by
future Iranian oil exports and was reportedly worth half of the Iranian
annual oil exports.206 But, while the idea of the credit line promised a
path to negotiations, Iran’s exports were conditioned by a waiver from
the U.S. sanctions, as it would directly breach them, if the funds were
derived from an EU-based financial institution or wired directly to
Iran.207 Despite the efforts of President Macron, Iran conditioned the
beginning of any talks—even informal phone conversations—upon
the removal of sanctions.208 At the same time, Trump was unwilling to
Iran’s Breaches of the Nuclear Deal, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE,
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205 Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N,
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meet with the Iranian Foreign Minister on the margins of the G7
meeting despite the fact that President Macron invited the Iranian
Foreign Minister for this very reason.209 Thus, the preferences of both
sides, on the side of Iran to have the sanctions removed before the
commencement of the talks and on the side of Trump to negotiate
with Rouhani directly excluded the possibility of negotiations.
Why was this personal approach so important? Simply put, it
allowed Trump the opportunity to establish rapport. As evidenced by
his previous negotiation record and dealings with North Korea and
attempts to strike a deal with the Taliban, Trump’s preferred method
of dealmaking involves direct contact with foreign dignitaries in which
he openly shares his concerns regarding domestic reactions to his
international deals.210. This allows him to focus on the preferences of
the negotiation partner, a strategy deployed by many skillful
negotiators,211 and to exhibit his powers of persuasion. Instead of
exploiting Trump’s preference and choosing to play to his weakness
by opening a prolonged negotiation process or a series of talks212 from
which the United States would not be able to easily backtrack, Iran
decided to play to its own strengths. Iran knew that its economy would
not crumble immediately under the reimposed sanctions. More
importantly, China kept buying Iranian oil and gas in defiance of the
U.S. sanctions, thus easing their effect,213 but also provoking U.S.
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foreign
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sanctions on Chinese companies.214 Iran’s allies in the region—
Hezbollah in Lebanon, Assad’s regime in Syria, and the Houthi rebels
in Yemen—fared well in the respective conflicts in which participated,
giving Iran some leverage that might influence future negotiations.215
This left little effect for Trump’s rhetoric on the course of actions in
Iran, reducing his comment to nothing more than a performance for
the global and domestic audiences. Iran’s approach, however, was not
without its weaknesses. Such an approach has an expiration date as
Iran will ultimately have to renegotiate its commitment to the nuclear
non-proliferation deal if the country continues to enrich uranium, as
sanctions continue to damage the Iranian economy.216 But, postJCPOA cancellation, Iran managed to strengthen its immediate
negotiating position. Iran also counted on the possibility that Trump
could be a one-term president and that his successor might not be
willing to risk so much in his or her future dealings within Iran. Given
the previous divisions concerning the internal support for JCPOA
within Iran,217 the political body appeared more consolidated due to
the waning support for the JCPOA and the majority support for a
withdrawal.218 It is difficult to measure the extent to which the
endowment effect, created by entering into JCPOA, contributed to
such a posture and to what extent this was a reaction to a high-risk
negotiation strategy deployed by President Trump, but there are
grounds to claim that it influenced Iran’s behavior.
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D. The use of force
Over the course of what is now a four-year standoff, both the
United States and Iran have used force against one another. The first
serious incident was Iran’s downing of a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle
over the Persian Gulf.219 Iran argued that the vehicle entered its
airspace—which would make Iran’s actions legal under international
law—while the United States argued that it had not, which would most
likely qualify the action as a frontier incident, in which its legality
becomes more complex.220 In response to this, the U.S. military
prepared a strike against Iranian aerial defense sites that was personally
canceled by Trump twenty minutes before the action was to
commence.221 Here, Trump demonstrated his controller side; he
opposed the hawkish views of his national security advisor, John
Bolton, (later firing him) and set aside the military option, believing it
would compromise the chances for negotiations.222 Thus, what many
perceived as a hawkish bias was instead posturing for the domestic
audience, more a communication strategy than an outline of a concrete
military action.
Instead, Trump authorized a cyberwarfare operation that,
allegedly, hurt the Iranian capabilities to target ships sailing through
the Persian Gulf.223 This created an additional legal problem;
Strait of Hormuz: US confirms drone shot down by Iran, BBC NEWS (Jun. 20,
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220
Mohamed Helal, The Global Hawk Incident: Self-Defense against Aerial
Incursions – Reflections on the Applicable Law, OPINIONJURIS (Apr. 7, 2019),
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/07/04/the-global-hawk-incident-self-defense-againstaerial-incursions-reflections-on-the-applicable-law/.
221
Bill Chappell, Trump Says He Called Off Strike On Iran Because He Didn’t See
It
As
‘Proportionate’,
NPR
(Jun.
21,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/06/21/734683701/trump-reportedly-orders-strike-oniran-then-calls-off-attack-plan.
222 See Trita Parsi, What Would It Take for Iran’s President to Meet With Trump?,
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
(Sep.
18,
2019),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2019-09-18/what-would-it-takeirans-president-meet-trump.
223
Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Cyberattack Hurts Iran’s Ability to Target Oil Tankers,
Officials
Say,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
28,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/us/politics/us-iran-cyberattack.html?module=inline.
219

104

2022 Int'l Law & Politics of the Trump Administration's Iran Policy

10:2

international law is unclear whether and how a state may respond to
cyberwarfare operations.224 Furthermore, in light of the previous
cyberwarfare operations between Iran and the United States, it is
unclear to what extent this attack was proportional to the Iranian cyber
operations against Saudi and U.S. targets between 2013 and 2019.225
For Iran, options for military engagement were available
through the actions of its allies in the region. The 2019 attack on Saudi
oil-producing facilities, widely believed to have been carried out either
by Houthi rebels of Yemen with the support of Iran or by its forces,
led to condemnation from both the EU and the United States.226 The
immediate response was an increase in the military presence of forces
capable of striking Iran within Saudi Arabia.227
However, Trump did authorize the targeted killing of General
Qassim Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds force.228
Accomplished through a drone operation in early January 2020, the
operation was presented as a response to a series of armed incidents in
which Shia militias funded and equipped by Iran operating on the
territory of Iraq targeted U.S. forces in Iraq..229 Did the series of Shia
militia attacks against the U.S. forces represent an adequate legal basis
for the killing of Soleimani to be considered an act of self-defense and
did that killing breach the U.S. President’s powers to use military forces
abroad? These questions strongly divided the legal community in both
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the United States and abroad. The answer depends on whether the
three demands for their legality—namely proportionality, necessity,
and imminence—of an Iranian attack were present. Given the series
of attacks on U.S. personnel in Iraq, the strike was presented as not
needing to satisfy the criteria of imminence, and the legality of the
attack was broadly justified by the invocation of the right to selfdefense of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.230
However, regardless of how we view the attacks, they were not
an expression of a hawkish bias or a strategic move meant to counter
the growing Iranian regional threat. Neither their legal basis nor the
technique by which they were conducted was an innovation of any
kind.231 Rather, it was the moment of their deployment and the
following de-escalation that was unique. More than a message that the
United States was ready to counter the growing Iranian regional
military presence by targeting one of its main architects, the attack was
a message that further military escalation would not be tolerated. Iran’s
retaliation, limited to firing ballistic missiles at a U.S. base, was
delivered after the Iraqi officials made certain that U.S. personnel were
warned.232
The failure of these incidents to lead to a further escalation
meant that neither side was willing to conduct a full military
confrontation. For President Trump, military action would go against
both his swaggering negotiation strategy that impresses with military
might, but is averse to its use and against his commitments to refrain
from initiating war in the Middle East. To this extent, President Trump
has also influenced Israel—a country that views Iran’s nuclear
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capability as an existential threat and has been contemplating an attack
on its nuclear facilities since 2004—not to get involved militarily.233
Thus, President Trump projected his reputational
understanding onto both North Korea and Iran. The approach worked
with the first but failed with the latter for two reasons. First, while
individual leaders are unitary entities, the states they lead are not.234
Unlike the leader of North Korea, the president of Iran and Iran’s
foreign minister face significant domestic constraints in foreign affairs
matters. Second, Iran’s understanding of losses and gains is opposite
to what was expected. Simply, Iran did not view the imposition of the
sanctions as a loss to be averted at any cost, worth entering
negotiations at any cost. This has directly clashed with Trump’s hope
that he could renegotiate or exchange the JCPOA for a different deal
through a personal relationship with the Iranian head of state.
E. BACK TO THE JCPOA?
Instead, the United States has resorted to calls for JCPOA
compliance. Following the approach of the expiration date of the ban
on Iran’s arms embargo, set for October 2020 as per JCPOA, the
United States began lobbying for a new approach to keep Iran
committed to the JCPOA by alleging that t Iran’s violations of its
agreement warrant an extension of the arms embargo on the country
as well as reinstatement of the U.N.’s previous sanctions.235 Under
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, any JCPOA party may demand
233
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that the sanctions on Iran be reinstated in the event of noncompliance.236 The non-compliance meant herein relates to Iran’s
stockpiling of uranium enrichment. Having exited the agreement in
2018, the United States bases its claim on the interpretation that any
party to the JCPOA held the right to initiate such proceedings before
the U.N. Security Council.237 Be that as it may, the lack of support from
the standing members of the U.N. Security Council238 made the point
moot.
An alternative negotiation initiative introduced by two U.S.
senators, Lindsey Graham and Robert Menendez, also gained
traction.239 Their plan envisaged a wider multilateral initiative that
would encompass the whole region and would essentially be dedicated
not only to the Iranian nuclear program but to regional stability as a
whole. Iran would continue the development of its nuclear program
with a stricter guarantee of its civilian purposes, but unlike the JCPOA,
this future agreement would be designed as a treaty and not a political
commitment.240 Thus, this agreement would evade one of the key
problems of the JCPOA—the ability of any U.S. administration to
cancel it. Senator Rand Paul also offered his diplomatic services,
apparently receiving support to serve in this capacity.241 None of these
initiatives yielded any result.
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Following the defeat of Donald Trump in the 2020 U.S.
Presidential election, the road for the return to the JCPOA seemed
open as President Biden claimed it would be one his foreign policy
priorities.242 However, the changed dynamics of both the United States
relations to its allies and the internal relations within Iran prevented
this move from occurring swiftly. Israeli intelligence service Mossad
assassinated the leading Iranian scientist working on its nuclear
program and the state of Israel continued to openly oppose the deal.243
Only in September 2021, following a months-long coalition building
process did the new Israeli government support negotiations with
Iran.244 It has sought, however, assurances that both Israel and the
international community will remain open to isolation and military
actions against Iran.245 Elections also happened in Iran where Hassan
Rouhani, a moderate who sought a swift renegotiation of the deal246,
was replaced by Ebrahim Raisi, the deal’s staunch opponent.247 That
promoted a change in the Iran’s negotiation strategy. After a swift renegotiation of terms concerning technical demands made by the IAEA
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that focused on the monitoring and surveillance248, the negotiations
stalled for months without progress. The EU and the United States
openly called on Iran to negotiate in a more expedient manner, only
for Iran to retort with demands that the United States should—having
been the first to exit the JCPOA—return to it by withdrawing the
unilateral sanctions.249
Important changes occurred in the negotiation teams on both
the Iranian and the U.S. sides. Iranians replaced its perceived moderate
negotiators with interlocutors less willing to compromise on Iran’s
regional presence and ballistic missile capability, two matters leftover
from Trump’s negotiations.250 The United States team included,
President Biden’s National Security Advisor Sullivan, one of the
original JCPOA key negotiators and an expert in the sanctions
regime251 who claims that a nuclear-free Iran is a U.S. priority.252
Therefore, both sides found themselves in a peculiar position; Iran is
openly violating the JCPOA through uranium enrichment, demanding
that the United States return to it by suspending sanctions and the
United States claims to seek a return to the JCPOA without willing to
concede on the point of sanctions until it is not certain that Iran will
cease the uranium enrichment. Further complications to the JCPOA
re-negotiation came from Russia which sought to retaliate to the
sanctions imposed on the country in response to its aggression on
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Ukraine by demanding exemptions that would allow it to continue
economic engagement with Iran.253
Thus, the re-negotiation strategy used by President Trump has
failed in its effort to bring about a new deal for Iran. A resort to
multilateral action remained a necessary precondition not only for
opening potential future negotiations between the two countries but
also for preventing the further growth of Iranian military power, which
is expected to strengthen following the expiration of the U.N. arms
embargo.254 However, even such multilateral engagement remains
uncertain in bridging a widened gap in trust. The United States now
has less reasons to believe that Iran will not seek to secretly develop
nuclear weapons than it had in 2015, when the original JCPOA was
made. Iran has less reasons to believe that a future change in
government will not bring another end to the JCPOA, if it is reinstated.
Both sides have played to their domestic audiences rather than to build
a multilateral deal. Additionally, changes in the international order have
made the renegotiation of the deal more difficult. None of this makes
the deal redundant as there are legitimate mutual interests to be
protected through its renegotiation but its questionable durability and
stability greatly increase the political risk of its renegotiation for all
parties involved.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law can, as David Kennedy has argued, be understood as
a performative art,255 and President Trump has, in the case of his
dealmaking with Iran, indeed performed as if he wanted to re-establish
his credo, “Deals are my art form.”256 His actions emphasized the
Iran, Russia and the JCPOA: Is a year of negotiations at risk?, ISPI (Mar. 18,
2022),
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United States’ use of its own law to govern transnationally,257 however,
this governance is now challenged in a way it had not been challenged
since the 1990s and the EU–U.S. stand-off concerning the unilateral
sanctions against Cuba.258 The challenge will not necessarily be legal as
the forums for a possible legal resolution remain unavailable or
associated with reputational or financial costs but technical, as the
creation of INSTEX testifies. Thus, commentators with a preference
for a constitutionalist understanding of international law may rejoice,
as President Trump’s actions have provoked countermoves, making
the challenged norms a site of contestation.259
Although Koh presents a strong argument for the resilience of
the transnational legal process260 seems, it cannot instill optimism
regarding the future stability of the international legal system. While
the combinations of outreach, sanctions, and the use of force via
cyberwarfare and targeted killing operations have characterized the
relations of the two states pre-JCPOA, the two countries’ reduction of
the negotiation process into a zero-sum game represents a major
change reflected in the U.S. policy shift towards Iran under President
Trump.
President Trump’s approach to international law and policy is
best defined not by what it brings to the table but by what it excludes.
It inverts interdependence into a weakness and not a strength. It
imposes sanctions that lack legitimacy and are not a multilateral tool
relying on interdependency. More importantly, as his negotiation
approach demonstrates, it changes the way in which states and other
international legal actors interact with each other. That, as we see, does
not stop the transnational legal process from happening, but it will
make it a less accurate map of the territory of international law. By
claiming that the patterns of behavior of states would internalize the
257 See Nico Krisch, More equal than the rest? Hierarchy, equality and U.S.
predominance in international law in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (2003).
258 See Ruys & Ryngaert, supra note 107, at 100–11 (outlining a set of diverse
policy options considered by the EU and other international actors).
222 See Jonathan Havercroft et al., Editorial: Donald Trump as global constitutional breaching
experiment, 7 GLOB. CON. 1, 9, 11 (2018).
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norms of external conduct, the theory of transnational legal process
predicted that obeying international law would by itself have a
liberalizing impact on the domestic legal system and politics.261
President Trump’s negotiation approach to Iran therefore represents a
snapshot of the moment in which an international actor takes an
exactly opposite path. It is a moment in which domestic policies—a
support to the base and from the base—become internationalized. In
this sense, Trump’s presidency can be understood as a kind of antiDag Hammarskjold moment: the behavior of an impresario who aims
to deconstruct much of the international legal system and legitimize
his nationalist policies through a grand bargaining game. 262 Recent
action of Iran, following the recommencement of the negotiations in
2021, display a similar attitude.
By such actions, international actors undermine the
foundations of the liberal international order and thereby open a space
for an examination, for which the behavioral approach to international
law and economics is an appropriate assessment tool. By examining
how the elements of political psychology, international law, and
international relations play out in these complex situations, this
approach may help us to translate into law and/or explain the demands
and actions of those leaders rooted in a commitment to the populist
discourse. After all, it is not for nothing that some proponents of the
realist approach to international law and international relations,
although themselves skeptical of Trump, exhibit a certain degree of
satisfaction with the loss of constituency experienced by the liberal
international order. Perhaps not surprisingly, this satisfaction263 is
driven by the belief that the evolution of international law was
mistaken for an ideological assumption about its normative pull and a
sense that the fall of the liberal hegemony could have already been
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predicted when it began in the 1990s.264 This, however, should not
mean that what we are witnessing reflects a return of power politics.
First, because power politics never really went away and second
because the “false promise of international institutions” and the
ideological bias of liberalism cannot so easily be replaced by
nationalism. The reason for the latter is that international cooperation
and international law as its language remain irreplaceable for most
other countries. Even if we accept the realist critique that the
international law relies on ideological assumptions, we should not
expect that it will suddenly become de-ideologized because one of its
main actors is undergoing a transformation as the result of an identity
crisis triggered by domestic concerns over political economy.
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